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BOOK REVIEWS
Legislative Processes: National and State. By Joseph P. Chamberlain.'
New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc. 1936. Pp. xi, 369. $3.50.
This book falls in that large category of competent but undistinguished general treatises which are useful as textbooks and as books
of reference, but which offer no fare for those seeking stimulating
style, brilliant insights, or new factual information. That the work
must be so classified is the more to be regretted because its author's
name would seem to promise more. As Director of the Legislative
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, Professor Chamberlain has had a wealth of contacts with legislators and legislative bodies.
As an academic political scientist, he has acquired familiarity with the
studies of legislation made by other researchers. The Owedding of
his practical experience with his academic background should have
yielded a child of happier mien than is Legislative Processes.
Mr. Chamberlain is concerned with "legislatures as the machinery
for statute lawmaking," and not with such other functions of legislatures
as impeachment, collaboration in appointments, influencing of domestic
and foreign policies, criticism of the executive branch of the government, and participation in the amending of constitutions. 2
Legislation is a field of study which the textbook writer apparently
must traverse crosswise, lengthwise, and possibly diagonally. The traditional approach has been dual-describing first the structural organization, and second the procedure of the legislative body. The first describes the legislative machinery at rest; the second shows it with the
wheels turning. This dual approach is difficult to handle, for each necessitates constant reference to the other. The wheels at rest can only
be understood by a person with a prior knowledge of how they are supposed to operate when the switch is turned on; and the description of
the motion of the machinery in action presupposes an acquaintance with
the nature of the parts. It will be seen from the chapter topics8 in Mr.
Chamberlain's work that the confusion of the dual approach has been
worse confounded by the selection of certain subjects for special treat1
Director, Legislative Drafting Research Fund and Professor of Public Law,
Columbia University.
'Among the chapter topics are: election of members; Congressmen and constituents; organization of Congress and the legislatures; standing committees; commissions of inquiry; selection of bills for submission; action in Congress; financial legislation, private and special acts; conference committees; legislative aids;
President and Congress; governor and legislature; courts and legislatures; party
in legislation; and lawmaking in connection with foreign affairs.
I Supra, note 2.
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ment, such as standing committees, conference committees, party influence in legislation, and the executive's relation to the legislature.
The principal defects of Legislative Processes are attributable to
this triple traversal of the highly integrated field of legislation. Repetitions, omissions, and inadequate treatment of topics are all somewhat
noticeable. As examples of repetition, the reader is thrice told that the
Governor's message to the legislature is effective because it gets wide
publicity; many times, too, is he reminded that State legislators spend
their week-ends at home rather than at the capital, and so are closely
in touch with their constituents. Among the omissions of the book, one
of the most unexpected is that of lobbying, for, though Mr. Chamberlain constantly and soundly insists that most legislation originates outside the legislature (usually in interest groups and executive departments), he does not mention lobbying as either a technique or'a problem. The failure to treat Congress' handling of District of Columbia
bills is a minor omission, but the less to be expected since there is discussion of the State legislature's handling of local bills. In the chapter
on "Congressmen and Constituents" the failure to broach the question
of how independent of his constituents' opinions a legislator should be,
of whether a legislator is a leader or a follower of public opinion, and
of whether Edmund Burke properly handled these questions in his
classic address to the electors of Bristol or merely thereby showed himself a poor politician, seems an omission as unfortunate as the neglect
of lobbying. Finally, several topics are not adequately treated,-possibly because the author thought they had been or would be covered on
one of his other treks across the same material. Only 17 lines of type
are devoted to proportional representation. The obligation to include
a treatment of the Presidential veto and Congress' action thereon is
discharged merely by the quotation of the relevant clause of the Constitution, no discussion or commentary appearing on any of the issues
that have arisen in connection with the veto. The real considerations
entering into the selection of members of committees in Congress are
never set forth (obviously it is incorrect to say that "the choice of members of each committee is guided by the principle of seniority," for
there is no seniority among the neophytes of a newly elected House).
But most surprising of all the inadequate treatments is the two-page
explanation of the advantages of Nebraska's single-chamber legislature.
The explanation does not mention the unicameral body's avoidance of the
conference committee evil, although Senator Norris, in his campaign for
the legislative reform, inveighed against this evil of bicameralism more
than against any other.
Apart from the specific weaknesses of repetition, omission, and in-
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complete coverage of topics, which might be attributed to the inherent
difficulties of the multiple approach to the legislative process, there are
more general impressions which bear out the characterization of the
book made at the opening of this review. The most prominent of these
impressions is that the author has failed to come to grips with the problems of legislative procedure. Professor Chamberlain skims along the
surface of many problems, but seldom plunges down into any of them.
On the purely descriptive side the book has more merit; even here,
however, there is scarcely an original contribution made, unless it be
in the occasional descriptions of New York legislative practices.
A short series of appendices contains useful examples of the forms
of bills, special orders, etc. A three-page bibliography is an odd combination of general books on legislation, books about particular laws of
Congress (e. g., Willis' The Federal Reserve System), Moore's eightvolume work on international law, manuals of legislative bodies, Congressional hearings on two bills, and a 1926 textbook on State Government. It contains no work on standing or investigating committees,
though competent works have been published; and it includes Odegard's specialized study on the Anti-Saloon League's lobbying activities,
while omitting Herring's general study of lobbying before Congress.
Professor Chamberlain has here written a book which disappoints.
Many of us who have long admired his efforts to improve legislative
procedure, and who have impatiently awaited his writing of a general
treatise on legislation, will regret that Legislative Processes does not
come up to our expectations. As one reviewer has put it, we still hope
"that some day the author will add a companion volume giving us the
critical evaluation which he is so well equipped to write but which was
not attempted here.
JAMES

W.

FESLER.

Department of Political Science,
University of North Carolina.
The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite. By Felix
Frankfurter. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
1937. Pp. 114. $1.00.
This little volume (based upon the Weil lectures at the University
of North Carolina in April, 1936) constitutes, in reality, a review of
the commerce clause during the years 1801-1888, for as Professor
Frankfurter says, there was little important construction of this clause
during the chief justiceship of Salmon P. Chase (1864-1873). The
value of the volume is that it gives a brief but true picture of the functioning of the court throughout the period covered, and seeks to de-
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stroy the false picture that has been painted of Taney by conventional
American history. A true picture of Taney does not detract from the
reputation of Marshall, but reveals Marshall and Taney as the two most
important figures in the constructive development of the commerce
clause. Although the author performs his task with skill, a true picture of Taney would have been strengthened by a discussion of Genessee
Chief v. Fitzhugh,' in which Taney, by reversing a decision of the court
under Marshall, extended federal admiralty jurisdiction to all navigable
waters.
The Genessee Chief case also emphasizes a point of view which Professor Frankfurter expresses, but does not emphasize to the extent
that the reviewer would have desired. Developments of transportation
and of other commercial facilities have made the problem of each later
period of our history different from, and more complex than, that of the
preceding period. Such developments have increased the transactions
in interstate commerce and the needs for uniform national regulation.
Although, as Professor Frankfurter says, Waite did not ordinarily possess the gift of "literary felicity," the author- neglects the opportunity
2
to quote the language of Waite in the Pensacola Telegraph Company
case, where Waite for once forgot his limitations, and stated with "literary felicity" the fact that the scope of national power increases with
the growth of transactions and facilities to which that power applies.
The opinions of the court under Marshall, Taney and Waite, just
as those since 1888, must'be weighed with reference to the problems of
the time when they were written. Under Marshall there was little of
federal regulation of commerce, and little need for such regulation;
and the issues were primarily ones as to the scope of state regulatory
and taxing power. This was also largely true under Taney and Waite.
With Wabash Railway Co. v. Illinois,3 (in which Waite dissented),
with the resultant Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and with
the more rapid developments of recent years, the essential issue has
come to be that as to the scope of federal regulatory power. Although importance is properly attached by the author to the doctrine
that federal inaction restricts state power where a single uniform rule
is required (pp. 18, 56, 96), the influence of this doctrine (which was
first announced as a restriction upon state regulatory power) has become important chiefly as an incident or incentive to the exercise of federal regulatory power, as indicated in the recent case of Kentucky Whip
& Collar Co. v. I. C. R. R.4 even though that power is used as an aid
112 How. 443, 13 L. ed. 1058 (1851).
Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708

(1878).

'118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct 4, 30 L. ed. 244 (1886).
'57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 183 (1937).
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to state policy. In the literature within the field of constitutional law,
too little emphasis has been placed upon the influence of facts. The
rule laid down by Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v.Board of Wardens,5
has become increasingly important because of the more complicated
structure of commerce, and by reason of the growth of a closer interrelationship between domestic and interstate commerce. Within the
brief scope of his lectures, the author could not have been expected to
give greater attention to changing facts than he has done, but we may
hope that he will elaborate his discussion in a larger volume tracing
developments down to the present time.
The author, fortunately, has not fallen a victim to the highly contagious disease which seems to have infected many of the recent authors
in the field of constitutional law-a disease whose chief symptom is
the view that all judges are but playing a game in which they are seeking to out-maneuver each other, and that their motives in the game
are to be determined by random quotations from opinions, considered
apart from their context and without regard to the issues and facts before the court. The author recognizes that judicial decisions are not
to be considered merely as pawns in a game, and that they are properly
determined by the issues before the court and by the economic facts of
the time to which they apply. The judicial application of the commerce
clause is different in 1937 from that of earlier days primarily because
the commerce to be regulated is different.
WALTER

F. DonD.*

Spendthrift Trusts: Restraints on the Alienation of Equitable Interests
Imposed by the Terms of the Trust or by Statute. By Erwin N.
Griswold.' Albany: Matthew Bender and Company. 1936. Pp. lxxv,
561. $8.50.
It was just one hundred years ago that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina initiated,2 through Judge Gaston, a series of decisions and
dicta outlawing spendthrift trusts in North Carolina. Chief Justice
Ruffin thus rationalized this attitude :3 "For it would be a shame upon
any system of law, if, through the medium of a trust or any kind of
contrivance, property, from which a person is absolutely entitled to a
comfortable, perhaps an affluent support, and over which he can exercise the highest right of property, namely, alienation, and which, upon
his death, would undoubtedly be assets, should be shielded from the
112 How. 299, 13 L. ed. 996 (1851).
* Member of the Chicago Bar; formerly Professor of Law, Yale University;
author of CAsas oN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1932).

Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N. C. 480 (1837).
'Mebane v. Mebane, 39 N. C. 131, 134 (1845).
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creditors of that person during his life. There is no such reproach
upon nor absurdity in our law."
During reconstruction, however, and four years before the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Nichols v. Eaton,4 gave the spendthrift
trust its first important judicial sanction, the North Carolina General
Assembly 5 validated the device if the income did not exceed five hundred dollars a year and if this was to be devoted to the support of certain close relatives. With but two exceptions, 6 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has adhered to the policies first laid down by Gaston
and Ruffin, unless the situation came within the statute just mentioned. 7 Then, last May came Chinnis v.Cobb.8 Measured by the provisions of the statute, the result reached on the facts is correct. But
the opinion of Devin J. indicates no awareness of the relationship between that statute and the judicial policy of this state rejecting the
common-law validity of spendthrift trusts. And, by its reliance upon
decisions from states having a contrary judicial policy and upon generalities of legal encyclopedias, the opinion betrays unawareness of the
fact that North Carolina's attitude toward spendthrift trusts is shared
by a minority of only seven out of the forty-two American jurisdictions which have dealt with the problem. 9
Professor Griswold's excellent treatise has particular significance
for North Carolina. In his chapter on "The Future of Spendthrift
Trusts," he concludes that the values of the device can best be secured
and the attendant social harms minimized through a legislative determination of the extent to which it may be utilized. To that end he offers a skilfully drafted model statute. In part the suggested legislation
is based upon the statutes of North Carolina and Virginia. 10 Pro'91 U. S. 716, 23 L. ed. 254 (1875).
5P. L. 1871-72, Ch. 204, now N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1742. Two
recent statutes, one enacted in 1925 and the other in 1927, exempt insurance proceeds from the claims of the creditors of the beneficiary of group insurance and
of non-profit life benefit association insurance. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§§6466(d), 6476(f).
Monroe v. Trenholm, 112 N. C. 634, 17 S. E. 439; rehearing denied 114 N. C.
590, 19 S.E. 377 (1894), criticized by GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THFE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) §§124s-124u; Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N. C. 454, 163 S.E.
572 (1932), criticized by GRIswoL, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) §211.
' The earlier North Carolina cases are treated separately by Gray in §§175,
177-178, 182, 213; all of the North Carolina cases down to Chinnis v. Cobb, and
the Act of 1871 in relation thereto, are discussed separately by Griswold in §§84,
210-211.
8210 N. C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936). Testamentary trust for a child of property yielding less than $500 a year, for her support and maintenance, neither res
nor income to be liable for her debts. Held: both immune against claim of mortgagee deficiency judgment creditor.
'Griswold,
§§53-58.
0
"

VA.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1930) §5157; Griswold, §§79, 227-229. This repre-

sents a 1918 legislative departure from a judicial policy of invalidity. Hutchinson
v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169, 40 S.E. 655 (1902).
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lessor Griswold would agree with the statement in Fowler v. Webster" that the North Carolina statute "serves a wise and humane public
policy and is protected against abuse by limiting the income ...
"
In fixing the amount of annual income which can be received free from
the claims of creditors, however, he follows the Virginia standard of
five thousand dollars a year rather than the now outmoded North Carolina standard of five hundred dollars a year. Because of modern conditions, the General Assembly would do well to re-examine, in the light
of Professor Griswold's many sliecific recommendations, the desirability
of overhauling our limitations on the spendthrift trust.
In the main, Professor Griswold's work is concerned with the legal
problems raised by the widespread use of spendthrift trusts in this
country. Perhaps one-third of the book is devoted to the history of
the judicial and legislative efforts to determine their validity. Included,
too, is a treatment of various collateral equivalents, such as the methods
used to immunize the proceeds of life insurance policies against creditors
of the beneficiaries. The decisions and statutes are dealt with state by
state. The thoroughness, accuracy, and discriminating criticisms demand repetition of Professor Powell's praise:12 "The willingness to
hunt unceasingly for cases is not often found combined with the keen
analytical powers, the facility for simple, clear writing, and the originality displayed by Professor Griswold in this book."
Two chapters will be especially useful to the practicing lawyer. One
relates to the drafting and administration of spendthrift trust provisions; the other to "the successful reaching of the unreachable." Here
one sees the extent to which immunities against creditors have broken
down before the appeals of particular situations, and of such claimants
as the state, the wife, child, administrator, guardian, receiver, or trustee
in bankruptcy of the beneficiary.
One may at times disagree with Professor Griswold. Indeed, at
one point,' 3 he has expressly disavowed concurrence with this reviewer.
All, however, must hail this intensive exploration of a narrow field as
.exemplifying the best which university scholarship may offer to the
future of American law.
M. T. VAN HECKE.
The University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill.
- 173 N. C. 442, 445, 92 S. E. 157, 158 (1917). Cf. MORDECAI, LAW LEcTUlES
(2d ed., 1916) 555: "Trusts of the character aimed at in this statute are called
'spendthrift trusts', the real objects of which are to defeat the wholesome rules
laid down by such judges as those of our court from whom I have quoted supra,
and to provide luxurious idleness for the vicious rather than to insure the independence of the unfortunate."
"Richard R. Powell, Columbia Law School, Reporter, Restatement of Property, in Book Review (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1215.
1§112, note 55.
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Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. By Reynolds
Robertson' and Francis R. Kirkham. 2 St. Paul and Kansas City:
West Publishing Co. and Vernon Law Book Co. Pp. vii, 1048.
$15.00.
Today, as periodically in the past, the Supreme Court of the United
States is a major popular issue in government. An unusual number of
books has been written in the past two years discussing, both in lay
and professional style, the history of the Court, its place in our government, its power, the personality of its Justices, its influence upon
our history, the quality of its work, its probable future and proposals
for alterations in its functions or powers. Some of the books have become "best sellers." Interest is high and the discussions have been exciting. The present book is not of that kind. It is a legalistic statement of the current appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and is
designed solely for professional use by "law-men." For others, and
even for lawyers reading solely out of general interest, the book can
serve only as a soporific which promises better results than the counting
of sheep.
The book will have undoubted professional utility. Both of the authors have had the advantage of terms as clerks to Chief Justice Hughes
and are intimately familiar with Supreme Court practice. They say
that they examined records and the Minutes, Journal and Dockets of the
Court for unreported precedents and had "access to the fund of precedent preserved in the Office of the Clerk." The book covers all the
minutiae of appellate review of the decisions of state and federal courts,
both obligatory and discretionary, and it skims through the procedural
matters treated in greater detail in an earlier book by one of the authors.3 Both in price and in get-up, the book is luxurious. Its structure makes a good deal of repetition inevitable. 4 But compression was
apparently not an objective. One gets the feeling that there was rather
an attempt to elaborate. The subject matter is minutely divided into
chapters and sections and each section has a full descriptive heading
even when the section consists of little more than a repetition of the
heading. Points are verbosely and tediously simplified as if for a child.
The footnotes are given luxurious accommodation. With very few exceptions the footnotes are confined to citations of cases in the Supreme
Court. There is almost no reference to periodical or other literature.
'Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars; author of APPELLATE'
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1928) ;

revised under the title PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1929).

'Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
"Supra, note 1.
"See,, e.g., the almost verbatim repetition of §75 (p. 127) in §80 (p. 136).
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The citation of each case is given a separate paragraph in the footnotes.
The Table of Cases Cited takes 110 pages and gives not only the full
name of the cases and the numbers of the sections and footnotes in which
each case is cited, but also the full citations of the cases in the official
reports, the Supreme Court Reporter, and the Lawyers' Edition. Yet
dates of decisions are nowhere given. The Index occupies 80 pages
of clear print, without division into columns. If these elaborate conveniences are advanced as justifications for the price of the book, they
fail of their purpose; but since the price is doubtless set without much
reference to the printing cost, we might as well have the conveniences.
Discussions of jurisdiction and procedure are at best quite dry. The
instrumental character of these institutions is frequently forgotten and
they are treated as ultimates as technical requirements with a vigor all
their own, though apparently purposeless. Yet, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States is susceptible of different treatment. For that Court is unique-unique in its power, in the territory
over which it exercises jurisdiction and the courts whose decisions it
may review, and in the functions which it performs in our government.
The jurisdiction of that Court. is determined not simply by considerations of convenience as to the division of judicial business but by considerations of politics, by the potential conflict of powers of the states
and the nation, by the relation of the judiciary to other branches of
government, by the needs of a national government covering a wide territory of federated states, and by the unenviable position of the Supreme Court as an arbiter of powers of government. When the jurisdiction and procedure of the Court are considered in this light they take
on a different significance and a new interest. Discussion can then be
made almost as live and exciting as discussions of the decisions of the
Court on constitutional issues. Messrs. Robertson and Kirkham have
had experience which doubtless gave them the knowledge and insight
necessary for such an interesting discussion. But they have apparently
chosen not to engage in it. The book is drier than dust. "Rules" and
"exceptions" to rules are stated in abstract, legalistic manner with no
indication of the ferment beneath the surface. One is left to wonder
how the maze came to be constructed and whether it can have any purpose other than a game for the malicious delight of Justices and counsel. The book discloses a number of instances in which the Court, by
choosing one rather than another ground for decision, expressly refused to decide a question of jurisdiction fairly presented by the record, argued by counsel and crying for decision in view of the confused
holdings of lower courts. And it presents other instances in which
the Court, to the dissatisfaction of both parties, disposed of cases on
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issues of jurisdiction raised of its own motion, not presented by the
petition for certiorari, waived by the parties and not argued by counsel
-leaving entirely undecided the disputed issues upon which the parties
went to the Court. Even this seeming eccentricity appears to be of no
significance and receives no explanation. 5 The Court is functioning and
all's well!
A book written on the model of A. L. R. annotations does not lend
itself to criticism or thorough perusal. This book squeezes out of the
cases all the verbal doctrine that is there, but adds little to understanding. The over-simplified discussions and the "reasons for the rule"
never go beneath the surface and add little to the verbal doctrine.6 It
may therefore be foolish to note any queries. For example, in discussing the review of orders of state regulatory commissions the authors state (p. 75) that if "the state system of procedure provides for
a review of commission orders by state appellate courts, which, upon
such review, act only in a legislative or an administrative capacity, the
decisions of the state courts in these proceedings may not be reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court under section 237" of the Judicial Code.
' See, e.g., §312, especially p. 635.
A recent example, which came after the publication of this book, is KVOS,
Inc. v. Associated Press, 57 Sup. Ct. 197, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 143 (1936). If the opinion of the Court contains the only explanation of the decision, then it indicts the
Court for obstructing, and trifling with, justice. Yet the decision may be explained
so as to make it a truly wise piece of statesmanship-and an exciting one. The case
came to the federal courts solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship. It involved a novel state of facts and a novel issue of law. The closest precedent urged
upon the Court was International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215,
39 Sup. Ct. 68, 63 L. ed. 211 (1918), which had itself divided the Court. The issue
was of considerable importance, involving the relations of the -press and the radio
in the dissemination of news, and did not quite fit the precedent. The radio is subject to considerable legislative and administrative regulation and to much public
interest and controversy, though on the specific issue there was no direct regulation. As the situation presented itself, the issue of law was to be governed by
state rather than federal law. If a state court decided it, the decision would be
binding only in that state. If the Supreme Court decided it, the decision would be
binding on federal courts throughout the country, though state courts would be free
to differ. It is under these circumstances that the Supreme Court refused to decide the dispute which the parties brought before it and instead, of its own motion,
raised a jurisdictional objection which the parties -did not argue, which they asked
the Court to forget and which might well have been decided in favor of the Court's
jurisdiction.
'A perhaps unfair example appears at pages 175-6. The authors quote from
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264, 410-411, 5
L. ed. 257, 292 (1821) : "'The writ of error is given, rather than an appeal, because
it is the more usual mode of removing suits at common law; and because, perhaps,
it is more technically proper, where a single point of law, and not the whole case,
is to be re-examined. But an appeal might be given, and might be so regulated
as to effect every purpose of a writ of error. The mode of removal is form, and
not substance.'" Then the authors explain as follows: "In other words, the mode
of removal is form, not substance; and if significance is to be given to the nature
of the writ, it may be said, perhaps, that it is more technically proper where a single point of law (i.e., the federal question), and not the whole case (i e., both
state and federal questions) is to be re-examined."
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But what is the bearing of the Ben Avon 7 case on the assumption? The
statement (p. 423, note 68) that the Wallace case 8 distinguishes to the
vanishing point the earlier reasoned dicta in the Willing9 and Grannis
cases 10 "to the effect that the Supreme Court is without power to review a state court judgment entered in a proceeding for a declaratory
judgment" would be quite accurate if such a dictum were made or implied; but it was not. Again, the authors justify the Court's "liberality"
in granting certiorari in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
on the ground that it is a "notorious fact" that state and lower federal
courts have given but "lip service to the statutory tests of liability." "Supervision of such decisions by the Supreme Court," they say (p. 612),
"with frequent reversals and restatements of the statutory tests of liability, have served to correct in large measure the disregard of the
statute by the courts below, and the Supreme Court now finds it necessary to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction in this class of cases with
less frequency." For this we have only the authors' word. Grants of
certiorari in this class of cases have indeed diminished. But has the
course of decisions in state and lower federal courts really been changed?
On this question the authors can hardly expect us to accept their unsupported word. Even if the authors' guess should be true, is criticism
"unearned" when, with complete freedom of choice, the Court spends
time and energy to see that, in its opinion, the results in particular cases
in this field of law square with the announced doctrine?
HARRY SHULMAN.
Yale School of Law.
The Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in Chicago. By Edward M.
Martin.' Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1936. Pp. xxi, 385.

$5.00.
Mr. Martin's book is largely a history of the bench of Chicago for
the past half century, in which he depicts the influence of political ma'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527,

64 L.
8 ed. 908 (1920).
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed.
7309 (1933).
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72 L. ed.
880 (1928).
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.

541 (1927).

'Edward M. Martin is a native of Chicago and for the past twelve years
has been public affairs secretary of the Union League Club of Chicago. During the
latter part of this period he has also been enrolled in the graduate school (department of political science) of the University of Chicago. His study of judicial
elections in Chicago was made in the latter connection. The character and scope
of the study were determined in large measure by the experience gained in civic

activity. In several judicial elections he was active in movements to enlist lay
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chines in selecting the judiciary. Although the title of the book is not
a misnomer it leads one to expect a picture of accomplishment on the
part of the Chicago bar in selecting the judges of that city, but it must
be frankly stated that, regardless of the efforts and sincerity of the lawyers, they have achieved little in this regard. The r6le of the bar in
electing the bench in Chicago has been a very minor one.
To a lawyer who is accustomed to a judiciary selected on the basis
of ability, learning, and character it comes as a revelation to learn that
in some of our large cities the prospective judges are assessed thousands of dollars by political bosses, that their appointments of receivers,
guardians, etc., are made for them by these same bosses, and that the
minimum penalty for failure to "play ball" is defeat, with the threat of
impeachment upon false charges not remote.
It appears that the courts in down-state Illinois are quite satisfactory, and that the judges are chosen in an atmosphere entirely different from that prevailing in Cook County and Chicago. Because the
people outside the metropolis do not have machine-controlled conventions and elections for their judiciary, and, therefore, have confidence
in their judges and courts, they have no desire to make a change in the
method of selection. Because those who dominate the conventions in
Cook County do not want to lose their control of the courts and the
consequent patronage in lucrative appointments as guardians, receivers
and attorneys, they want no change, either. The anomalous result is
that gangsters, rings and racketeers who control a large vote in Chicago are working side by side with "the hinterland" to perpetuate a
system satisfactory to both for entirely divergent reasons-the latter
because it gives them good judges, and the former because it doesn't!
And the Chicago Bar is left to wage a determined, idealistic, but apparently hopeless, fight against them. In this one-sided combat it is
little wonder that the Bar is a poor second-best.
Notwithstanding the deplorable conditions Mr. Martin describes
he is not entirely critical of the personnel of the Chicago judiciary-indeed, the impression he leaves is that the bench is of much higher calibre
than could be reasonably expected in view of the unattractiveness of a
judicial career under such uncertain and uninviting methods. He
shows, too, that some of the bitterest critics of the system are to be
civic agencies and individuals in plans for giving widespread publicity and distrbution to the recommendations of the Chicago Bar Association's Bar Primary
on candidates for the judiciary.
As an active member of the National Municipal League he became associated
with a joint committee on judicial selection of that organization, and of the
American Judicature Society. The survey of state laws relating to judicial selec-

tion, tenure, etc., was undertaken in that capacity and was included in the study

as published to give comparative basis for the suggested plan for improving judi-

cial zelection in Chicago, as set forth in his book.
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found on the bench! They resent a political assessment of four or five
thousand dollars when they have to run every four or six years. They
also resent the fact that the court attendants, etc., whom they are supposed to select, are furnished for them by the political powers, and that
these same employees are really determining the length of tenure of the
judges by the reports they make to their political organizations, rather
than the reverse.
During the depression, hundreds of foreclosures and receiverships
came into the Cook County courts. As a result, thousands of receivers,
commissioners, attorneys, caretakers, janitors, and repairmen were appointed by, or under the supervision of the judges. Following charges
by one of the judges in the campaign of 1932 as to the reasons behind
many appointments, the Bar Association made an investigation and published its findings in a scathing pamphlet. It stated that "political influence found its way into the conduct of foreclosure proceedings" and that
"many of the judges frankly acknowledge that in appointments they
have followed the suggestions of their political sponsors." Mr. Martin says, "This blight has become progressively worse since 1930, until
now some of the judges openly admit they are subjecting their judicial
functions to the dictates of politicians."
In attempting to find a solution to the problem, Mr. Martin has investigated the method of selecting judges in various states. Most interesting of these is the California plan, in which the Governor fills
vacancies by appointment of one from a list of three nominated by a
committee composed of the Chief Justice, the Presiding Justice
of the District Court of Appeal and the Attorney-General. The appointee holds office for two years, at the end of which he runs
against his own record, the ballot being worded, "Shall Judge Blank
be continued in office?" If a majority of the votes cast are in
the affirmative, he continues for a full term of six years, when he again
faces the answer to the question put to the electorate. Should a majority be in the negative, his successor is appointed in the same manner
as he was. This plan seems to have all the advantages of keeping the
jiudiciary as far removed from politics as possible, and yet leaving with
the people the right to dispense with any judge whose services are unsatisfactory. The desirability of the plan is obvious. In the first
place, it does much to insure the nomination of three well-qualified
candidates for each position, chosen by men who are motivated by the
desire to get judges of ability, and who have an opportunity to know
all those available. In the second place, it removes the opportunity for
the demagogue or one willing to engage in a cat-and-dog fight on personalities or partisanship to attain the bench, for if one of this type
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should attempt to unseat an incumbent he would automatically disqualify himself in the eyes of the nominating committee. Thus, a judge
who conducts himself properly need have no fear of expensive primaries or the possibility of stacked conventions, while the people may
always obtain relief where they really desire it.
For Chicago and Cook County, Mr. Martin suggests the election of
a Chief Justice who shall appoint all the other judges from a list of
eligibles provided by a commission elected by the lawyers of Cook
County. The judges so named would run on their records each six
years, as in California. It is too bad that such a meritorious and wellconsidered plan has no better chance of immediate adoption than Mr.
Martin prophesies.
Mr. Martin's book is evidently the result of many years of thought
and study. It should interest every lawyer in the United States, as well as
any person interested in government; and no one who undertakes its
reading should fail to find it informative and interesting. Those accustomed to respect their courts and to believe that they are honestly
and impartially administered, will be startled by the conditions described
by the author as existing in practically every large city in the country,
Chicago being no better and no worse than the others. Mr. Martin's
frank and studious analysis may awake some to an effort to remedy the
conditions he so graphically describes.

J. WILL

PLESS, JR.*

Conflict of Criminal Laws. By Edward S. Stinson.1 Chicago: The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1936. Pp. xi, 219. $5.00.
The author tells us that his purpose is "to make a thorough analysis
of the problem of jurisdiction over crime with a view to ascertaining
and recommending general principles to be applied in solving the problem, to accurately state the law, and to collect and cite all the AngloAmerican authorities it was possible to find." This is an ambitious purpose, well worth carrying out. If we ask whether the author has completely achieved his purpose, presumably the answer will depend, in
part, at least, upon one's notion of what a "thorough analysis of the
problem" requires.
If one assumes that such an analysis involves beginning with an adequate discussion of the purposes and ends of the criminal law and the
best means to attain them, the answer is that the present discussion
leaves much to be desired. These purposes and ends are stated only inferentially rather than explicitly, that is, they are left to be gathered
* Judge Superior Court, Marion, North Carolina.

'Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

from such statements as that a "government has no interest in the conduct of its citizens abroad except when that conduct results in injury
to it, because the peace and good order of its territory is not disturbed,'
and that "punishment" ought not ordinarily to be meted out to a government's citizens-and, a fortiori, to foreigners-for conduct occurring abroad, because of the possibility of "double punishment for
the same act." These and similar statements rather clearly place the
emphasis upon "punishment," perhaps partly as retribution and partly
as a means of preventing through fear the doing of similar acts by
others. Apparently, in the classic words of Gilbert's immortal Mikado,
we should "let the punishment fit the crime." This point of view leads
more or less directly to the orthodox Anglo-American doctrine of "jurisdiction" over crime, with its stress upon the place in which the "crime
is committed."
On the other hand, as the reviewer has elsewhere pointed out,2 if
the emphasis is shifted primarily to the prevention of conduct regarded
in the given state as anti-social, and if, in connection with this, the segregation of the offender is regarded in large part from the point of view
of the possibility of reclaiming the "criminal," the place in which the
"crime is committed" at once comes to assume less importance. The enforcement of the criminal law becomes to a considerable degree a means
of selecting persons in need of remedial treatment, or of permanent
detention where cure is impossible. When the matter is viewed in this
way, it becomes of less importance where the acts of the accused were
done. His conduct reveals certain anti-social tendencies or behavior
patterns which need to be dealt with in some way or other. He must be
either reformed or locked up. What was unreasonable from the older
point of view may thus become quite reasonable when one shifts to the
other point of view.
The author's treatment of "the territorial principle" of "jurisdiction" naturally is influenced by his'acceptance of the orthodox view of
the purposes and ends of the criminal law. It also suffers from a lack
of clear analysis of the meanings of such words as "power" and "jurisdiction." Thus his opening sentence reads: "A sovereignty's jurisdiction or power to deal with crime depends upon its jurisdiction or power
over persons or property." (Italics supplied.) And in stating this "territorial principle of jurisdiction," the author divides it into two principles, only the first of which he regards as a matter of "jurisdiction."
This principle is that "a sovereignty has power or jurisdiction over all
persons in its territory, and -has no power or jurisdiction over persons
within the territory of another sovereignty." (P. 3. Italics supplied.)
"Cook, The Application of the CriminalLaw of a Country to Acts Committed

by ForeignersOutside the Jurisdiction (1934) 40 W.

VA.

L. Q. 303, 328.
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Cited for this proposition are, of course, Story and Beale. Ignored are
all criticisms of writers who differ from the "territorial" school, writers
who have pointed out the need both for a more precise definition of
such words as "power" and "jurisdiction," and a more careful analysis
of the phenomena of legal decision. If physical "power" is meant,
then, granted the present territorial organization of modem political
society, the author's statement is, as he points out, "merely a statement
of fact, a recognition of reality." (P. 4.) But the word "jurisdiction"
seems to connote legal "power," not merely physical "power," and so
its use as a synonym for "power" without careful definition usually
leads to ambiguity in the resulting discussion.
Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that from the reviewer's
point of view a "thorough analysis of the problem" is not found in the
present work. Accepting it as based upon an orthodox type of analysis,
what is to be said of its statements of existing law? On the whole they
are an accurate presentation of the decisions, but the discussion is misleading at points, and necessarily so because of the lack of clean-cut
definition of the terms referred to. For example, the author takes the
view that where a person acts in one state and produces consequences
in a second state, the state which should deal with the matter and whose
law should be applied is that in which the "act" took place rather than
that in which the results occurred. Apparently he reaches this conclusion by thinking of "power" and "jurisdiction" as synonymous. In
this way his argument involves an unnoticed shift in meaning from
"physical" to "legal" power. That is to say, from the assertion that
only the state where the actor was physically present had "power" over
him, he concludes that if the alleged criminal is later punished by the
second state (in which he was not physically present when he acted)
that state is "applying law to which the actor was -not subject at the
time of the act." (P. 49. Italics supplied.) Does "not subject" mean
"not physically subject" or "not legally subject"? If the former, the
question arises: why should not "law" to which the accused was not
"physically subject" nevertheless be applied to determine the legal qualities of his conduct? He has certainly disturbed the "peace and good
order" of the second state more than that of the first, and, moreover,
protection against the likelihood of his repeating the act may well be
needed by that state. If, on the other hand, "not subject" means that
"legal power" is lacking in the second state, the answer is that under
our law as it now stands that is not true: both orthodox legal theory and
the actual phenomena of judicial decision confer "jurisdiction" on the
state in which the consequences of acts done elsewhere have occurred.
In his anxiety to sustain his thesis that the proper state to "punish"
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is that in which the act rather than its consequences occurred, the author cites such well-known cases as People v. Batkin,3 and People v.
Licenziata4 as "opposed" to the view that the state in which the consequences occur is to "punish" rather than that in which the act occurred. These and similar decisions are, of course, based entirely upon
statutes which were passed in order to permit the courts of the state
in which the accused acted to deal with him, even though the consequences of his act occurred beyond its borders. These statutes usually
authorize the trial of alleged criminals where the "crime" is committed
"inwhole or in part" within the state, and the courts usually interpret
them as making trial permissible where any part of the series of "acts"
plus definitional "consequences" has occurred. The author, however,
regards this as erroneous, asserting that "strictly speaking, there cannot be part of a crime. There is only one criminal act and one moment
of time when the crime is committed." (P. 93. Italics supplied.) Obviously, whether such a statement is true or false depends upon what
one means by the verbal symbols "crime" and "committed." Clearly
also there is no "crime" unless the accused acted (or in some cases
"omitted to act") and certain definitional "consequences" in the external world followed from the "act." The verbal symbols "commit a
crime" have been used by the legislatures in the statutes concerned to
denote this whole series of acts (movements of actor's body) plus consequences, with intent to authorize "punishment" if any part of the series occurred within the borders of the particular state. In so using
language the legislatures and courts are simply exercising the sovereign
prerogative of Humpty Dumpty.5 The wisdom of their action cannot
be determined merely by asserting that "there is only one criminal act"
which happens at "one moment of time."
The author's attempts to locate this "one criminal act" and the single "moment of time" when it is "committed." combined with his "territorial principle," lead him to some strange results. Thus, in dealing
with the obtaining of property by false pretenses, he informs us that
"no part of the crime is committed where the false pretenses are made"
(p. 91) :this in spite of an assertion earlier on the same page that "two
acts are necessary to constitute "this particular crime," namely, "making of false pretenses and the obtaining of property." Cases like People
v. Zayas,6 which under statutes apply the law of the place where the
*132 Cal. 231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901).
'199 App. Div. 106, 191 N. Y. Supp. 619 (1921).

'"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a scornful tone, "it means

just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice,
"whether you can make words mean different things."
Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."

'217 N. Y. 78, Ill N. E. 465 (1910).

"The question is," said
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false pretenses are made are accordingly condemned as unsound. Moreover, the author tells us, criminality in this group of cases should be
determined by the "law of the state in which the accused was at the time
title [to the property] passed." (P. 95. Italics supplied.) This unusual conclusion apparently is supposed to follow from the "territorial
principle": the accused is "subject" only to the law in force in the
state where he was when the "one criminal act" occurred, i. e., when
title passed.
For those who, like the reviewer, find the author's fundamental
analysis of "jurisdiction" unsatisfactory, the chief use of the book will
be as a convenient collection of the cases on the subject. So far as the
present writer has tested it, that collection leaves little to be desired.
WALTER WHEELER CooK.
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